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Hybrid Tribunals and the Composition of the Court: In 
Search of Sociological Legitimacy 
Harry Hobbs∗ 
Abstract 
 
Sociological legitimacy is a critical yet undertheorized element of a successful international 
criminal tribunal. This Article examines the link between sociological legitimacy and the 
composition of hybrid courts by analyzing the practice of five international criminal tribunals: the 
ICC, ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and the ECCC. It finds that the presence of local judges on 
international criminal courts offers a firmer normative basis for enhancing their legitimacy among 
the local community. However, the Article also finds that despite impressive scholarly efforts to 
demystify the “homogenous” international community, international judges are not sufficiently 
particularized. The solution I offer is both principled and pragmatic. The appointment of 
international judges should prioritize individuals from regional states (provided the states were 
not involved in the conflict), those of the same legal tradition, and individuals who speak a 
language of the affected state. This solution pays greater respect to national sovereignty and 
enhances the prospect that judges sensitive to local customs will be involved, increasing the 
likelihood that the court will be regarded as legitimate. The court’s sociological legitimacy, in turn, 
heightens the court’s prospect of success. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On August 7, 2014, the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) 
and the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central 
African Republic signed a memorandum obligating the government to establish a 
“Special Criminal Court.”1 On April 22, 2015, the National Transitional Council, 
the country's interim parliament, adopted a law establishing such a court, and on 
June 3, 2015, Catherine Samba-Panza, interim President of the CAR, promulgated 
that law.2 The Court will have jurisdiction throughout the CAR, and the authority 
to conduct preliminary investigations, judicial examinations, and to try “all war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed on the territory of the Central 
African Republic since 2003.”3 It will be comprised of twenty-seven judges, 
fourteen from the CAR and thirteen from other states. 
This significant development comes only sixteen months after the U.N. 
Mission in South Sudan recommended that a special or hybrid court be considered 
in order to “pursue genuine accountability” of perpetrators involved in the civil 
war that has raged since December 2013.4 One month before the issuance of that 
Report, in April 2014, a coalition of 146 national and international NGOs called 
upon the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to pass 
draft legislation establishing a “Specialized Mixed Chambers” in an effort to 
“bring an end to Congo’s history of rampant abuse.”5 More recently, on August 
3, 2015, Kosovo lawmakers passed legislation establishing “Specialist Chambers” 
comprised of international judges to try members of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
accused of atrocities against Serbs, Roma, and Kosovo Albanians who were 
suspected of collaboration with the Serbian regime.6 Additionally, on September 
                                                 
1  Memorandum of Intent between the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in the Central African Republic and the Government of the Central African Republic, 4 
(Aug. 7, 2014) (unofficial translation). 
2  Géraldine Mattioli-Zeltne, Taking Justice to a New Level: The Special Criminal Court in the Central African 
Republic, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 13, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2015/07/13/taking-justice-new-level-special-criminal-court-central-african-republic.  
3  Mark Kersten, Courtside Justice: Central African Republic’s Hybrid Tribunal Could be a Game-Changer, 
JUSTICE HUB (May 13, 2015), https://justicehub.org/article/court-side-justice-central-african-
republics-hybrid-tribunal-could-be-game-changer. 
4  U.N. Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Rep., Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report, 
Recommendation Five, ¶ 312-13 (May 8, 2014). 
5  Democratic Republic of Congo: No More Delays for Justice – Establish Specialized Mixed Chambers and Adopt 
ICC Implementing Legislation During the Current Parliamentary Session, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (April 1, 
2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/01/democratic-republic-congo-no-more-delays-
justice. 
6  Marija Ristic, Kosovo’s New War Court: How Will it Work?, BALKAN INSIGHT (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/how-will-special-kosovo-court-work--08-05-2015; 
Marija Ristic, Ivana Nikolic& Petrit Collaku, Kosovo’s New War Court: Major Challenges Ahead, 
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16, 2015, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights recommended the 
establishment of a “hybrid special court” to address systemic human rights 
violations in Sri Lanka.7 After a period of dormancy,8 it appears that hybrid 
criminal tribunals have returned as a viable option in international criminal 
justice.9  
This should not come as a surprise. Despite facing a range of problems 
concerning design and implementation,10 hybrid tribunals still hold significant 
promise for many in the international criminal justice field11—not to mention for 
victims of international crimes. For countries suffering from systemic violations 
of international criminal law, hybrid tribunals are seen as offering the potential for 
a catalytic transition to normalcy based on a tripartite grounding of legitimacy, 
capacity building, and norm penetration.12 However, it is important to 
contextualize this shift back towards hybrid courts. Today, international criminal 
justice is suffering something of a crisis of legitimacy.13 The slow collapse of the 
                                                 
BALKAN INSIGHT (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-s-new-war-
court-major-challenges-ahead-08-11-2015; Statement by Federica Mogherini on the Law on Specialist 
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, EUROPEAN WESTERN BALKANS (Aug. 4. 2015), 
http://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2015/08/04/statement-by-federica-mogherini-on-the-law-
on-specialist-chambers-and-specialist-prosecutors-office/. 
7  Rep. of the Human Rights Council, Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka, July 14–Oct. 2, 
2015, Recommendation 20 at 250, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/CRP.2, 30th Sess. (Sept. 16, 2015); see 
also id. ¶¶1246, 1278. 
8  Between 2000 and 2007, six hybrid courts were created. No further hybrid courts were established 
until the CAR Special Criminal Court in June 2015. 
9  See Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Criminal Law 
Goes International: 20 Years of Accountability and the Future of International Criminal Law (July 
7, 2014) (lecture delivered at the ANU College of Law) (arguing that the future of international 
criminal law is less international justice, more hybrid courts). 
10  See, for example, Caitlin Reiger, Hybrid Attempts at Accountability for Serious Crimes in Timor Leste, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 143, 164 
(Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006); Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor 
and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F. 185, 186 (2001); Charles T. Call, Is 
Transitional Justice Really Just?, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 101, 107-109 (2004). 
11  See, for example, Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for 
Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/08/2, U.N. 
Sales No. E.08.XIV.2 (2008); Neha Jain, Conceptualising Internationalisation in Hybrid Criminal Courts, 
12 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 81, 88 (2008); Jane Stromseth, Justice on the Ground: Can International Criminal 
Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies?, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 87 (2009); 
Parinaz Kermani Mendez, The New Wave of Hybrid Tribunals: A Sophisticated Approach to Enforcing 
International Humanitarian Law or an Idealistic Solution with Empty Promises?, 20 CRIM. L.F. 53, 55 (2009). 
12  Laura A. Dickinson, Comment, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 300 (2003). 
13  David Luban, After the Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice, 11 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 505, 509 (2013).  
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case against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta,14 the halting of investigations 
against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir,15 and the African Union’s push to 
guarantee immunity for sitting heads of state16 are just three stark illustrations of 
the current dilemma. If we are to avoid the mistakes of the past, it is crucial that 
future hybrid courts are not simply constructed as sui generis “expedient stopgaps” 
or as generic imitations of other hybrid courts.17 If the proposed courts in South 
Sudan, the DRC, and Sri Lanka are to be established, it should be after extensive 
evaluation of the failings of previous hybrid courts. 
This Article adds to the literature examining and evaluating hybrid tribunals. 
Its aim is to aid policymakers tasked with establishing such tribunals. It does so 
by analyzing an area often taken for granted, but absolutely critical, in ensuring 
the successful functional operation of any court: the composition of the bench. 
Since the emergence of hybrid tribunals in the late 1990s, scholars have attempted 
to corral these heterogeneous institutions in order to define their common 
features. Despite some diversity of opinion around the edges, scholars widely 
recognize that the mixed composition of local and international judges is a 
defining characteristic of these tribunals.18 However, while there is growing 
scholarship on international judges,19 few scholars have focused specifically on the 
                                                 
14  ICC Drops Uhuru Kenyatta Charges for Ethnic Violence, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019; see also Susanne D. Mueller, Kenya and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC): Politics, the Election and the Law, 8 J. E. AFR. STUD. 25, 29-37 (2014).  
15  ICC Prosecutor Shelves Darfur War Crimes Inquiries, BBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30458347. 
16  Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (Oct. 2013). 
17  Padraig McAuliffe, Hybrid Tribunals at Ten: How International Criminal Justice’s Golden Child Became an 
Orphan, 7 J. INT’L L & INT’L REL. 1, 7 (2011). 
18  Sarah Nouwen argues that the mixed composition of the Bench is the “only defining commonality” 
of hybrid tribunals. Sarah M.H. Nouwen, ‘Hybrid courts’: The Hybrid Category of a New Type of 
International Crimes Courts, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 190, 213 (2006). More recently, Sarah Williams has 
established a six-part definition, though she recognizes that “[p]erhaps the most clearly defining 
feature of a hybrid or internationalised tribunal is the mixed composition of the tribunals . . . 
particularly regarding the participation of international judges.” SARAH WILLIAMS, HYBRID AND 
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: SELECTED JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 204 (2012); see also 
Laura A. Dickinson, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The Case of Kosovo, 
37 NEW ENG. L. REV 1059, 1059 (2003); Dickinson, supra note 12, at 295; Etelle R. Higonnet, 
Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 347, 356 (2006). 
19  See, for example, RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, 
PROCESS, AND POLITICS (2010); DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES (2007). 
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composition of hybrid tribunals,20 and there has been little attention to analyzing 
in detail the link between tribunal composition and sociological legitimacy.  
In this Article, I argue that the principle of fair reflection may provide a 
firmer conceptual basis for the selection of judges on hybrid tribunals. In short, 
this principle suggests that the composition of a court should mirror the society 
over which the judges exercise jurisdiction. I test this hypothesis by investigating 
the links between sociological legitimacy and the composition of a spectrum of 
international criminal tribunals, ranging from purely international to purely hybrid. 
The courts examined are: the International Criminal Court (ICC), the two ad hoc 
tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—as well as the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The analysis of these courts supports my 
hypothesis, but it also reveals that an inadequate theorization of mixed 
composition has limited the potential legitimacy benefits that hybrid courts can 
offer. 
Indeed, this Article argues that theoretical analysis of the sociological 
legitimacy of international courts is underdeveloped. Despite impressive scholarly 
efforts to demystify the “homogenous” international community21 and practical 
judicial training exercises aimed at ensuring that all judges on international 
tribunals are sensitive to local context, international judges on international 
tribunals are not sufficiently particularized. In many respects, a simple dichotomy 
is proffered, dividing between “local” and “international” judges.22 Too often, the 
“local” judge is deeply personalized and contextualized to the point of suspicion 
of bias, corruption, or incompetence, while the “international” judge is entirely 
abstracted, neutralized, and decontextualized as expert.23 This unstated 
presumption is both naïve and potentially destabilizing. 
                                                 
20  The only significant examination is Cesare P.R. Romano, The Judges and Prosecutors of Internationalized 
Criminal Courts and Tribunals, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA 
LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA 235–70 (Cesare P.R. Romano, André Nollkaemper 
& Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2004). For a brief but useful discussion on “nationality,” see Leigh Swigart, 
The “National Judge”: Some Reflections on Diversity in International Courts and Tribunals, 42 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 223 (2010). 
21  See, for example, Sarah M.H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Symposium: Pursuing Global Justice Through 
International Criminal Law, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 73 (2015).  
22  At this point, it is helpful to explain certain terminology used here. Throughout the Article, I will 
refer to “local” and “international” judges, as well as “judges on international tribunals”. A “local” 
judge refers to a judge of the same nationality of the affected state, whereas an "international" judge 
refers to a judge of a different nationality. The catchall phrase “judges on international tribunals” 
refers to both local and international judges. 
23  Elizabeth M. Bruch, Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity Through a Post-Colonial Lens, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
1, 35–36 (2010).  
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This Article is divided into four substantive sections. In Section II, I provide 
a brief definition of hybrid tribunals and explain how they are positioned to offer 
greater sociological legitimacy than purely international tribunals. The third 
Section delineates the Article’s theoretical framework, linking the principle of fair 
reflection to the concept of sociological legitimacy. In Section IV, I argue that the 
absence of guaranteed local judges on the ICC, as well as the ICTY and ICTR, 
has served as a spark for criticism, weakening the courts’ legitimacy within affected 
states and undermining international criminal justice as a whole. In Section V, I 
extend the analysis a step further, arguing that although all supranational criminal 
courts have recognized the importance of geographic representation or 
representation of pluralistic legal traditions, none have really engaged in what 
representation should mean for hybrid courts in a way that enhances sociological 
legitimacy. The solution I offer is both principled and pragmatic. The international 
dimension can be particularized in order to favor selection of judges from regional 
states (provided the states were not involved in the conflict), judges from states 
of the same legal tradition, and judges who speak a language of the affected state. 
This solution pays greater respect to national sovereignty and enhances the 
prospect that judges sensitive to local customs will be involved, which offers 
potentially firmer grounding for the court’s sociological legitimacy.  
II.  ON HYBRID TRIBUNALS  
Writing in 2011, Padraig McAuliffe noted that the hybrid court, 
“international criminal justice’s golden child,” had become an “orphan” over the 
second half of the first decade of the new millennium.24 While six hybrid courts 
were established between 2000 and 2007, no additional courts were created until 
earlier this year.25 Significantly, it appears that more will be created soon, as efforts 
are mobilizing to establish new hybrid criminal courts in South Sudan, the DRC, 
and Sri Lanka.26 This flurry of activity necessitates an element of caution. Hybrid 
tribunals initially fell out of favor because they failed to achieve their lofty goals.27 
Therefore, before rushing headfirst into a second era of hybrid criminal justice, it 
is important to take stock. In this section, I will survey definitions of hybrid and 
internationalized criminal courts and explore where these courts have been 
established. I will also briefly note that in balancing sovereignty with 
accountability, these courts have the potential to disarm the imperialism critique 
                                                 
24  McAuliffe, supra note 17, at 1.  
25  Philippe Flory, International Criminal Justice and Truth Commissions, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 19, 25 n.22 
(2015). 
26  See Williams, supra note 18, at 149–85 for other proposed potential hybrid courts.  
27  Whether they could ever have hoped to achieve such lofty goals is another question. See McAuliffe, 
supra note 17, 63–65. 
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of international criminal law. However, an inadequate theorization of hybridity 
that fails to understand the importance of sociological legitimacy will torpedo this 
potential benefit. This is why the composition of hybrid courts is so crucial.  
Hybrid and internationalized criminal courts emerged during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Characterized as a “third generation” of international criminal 
law28 or “international criminal justice 3.0,”29 their development owed much to a 
peculiar convergence of factors. These included a wavering international 
commitment to the sprawling, costly, and lengthy ad hoc tribunals; the absence of 
a permanent supranational criminal court; and a growing appreciation that states 
should have primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute international 
crimes, combined with a keen awareness that post-conflict states may not be able 
to try cases in accordance with international standards.30 With a “pared-down 
budget, tightly focused mandate [and a] limited period of operation,”31 these 
courts were conceived as being effective, expeditious, and “specially tailored to 
the unique features of the crimes they are designed to handle.”32  
The courts most commonly referred to as “hybrid” or “internationalized” 
are a diverse group. They comprise the “Regulation 64” Panels in the Courts of 
Kosovo33; the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor34; the SCSL35; the 
ECCC36; the War Crimes Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina37; and the Special 
                                                 
28  Higonnet, supra note 18, at 352. 
29  Harold Hongju Koh, International Criminal Justice 5.0, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 525, 531 (2013). 
30  Williams, supra note 18, at 60–63, 201; Higonnet supra note 18, at 347. 
31  Beth K. Dougherty, Right-Sizing International Criminal Justice: The Hybrid Experiment at the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, 80 INT’L AFF. 311, 311 (2004). 
32  Antonio Cassese, Reflections on the Current Prospects for International Criminal Justice, in LOOKING TO THE 
FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 433, 437 
(Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011) (emphasis omitted). 
33  U.N. Interim Admin. Mission in Kosovo, Reg. No. 2000/64 on Assignment of International 
Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of Venue, UNMIK/REG/2000/64 (Dec. 15, 2000). 
34  U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Reg. No. 2000/11 on the Organization of Courts in East 
Timor, UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (Mar. 6, 2000). 
35  Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, art. 13(1) (Jan. 16, 2002), 
annexed to the Agreement between the U.N. and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone [hereinafter SCSLSt]. 
36  Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, U.N.-Cambodia, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. No. 41723. 
37  Agreement between the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the Establishment of the Registry for Section I for War Crimes and Section II for 
Organised Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption of the Criminal and Appellate Divisions of the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Special Department for War Crimes and the Special 
Department for Organised Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption of the Prosecutor’s Office of 
Bosnia and Hercegovina. Official Gazette of BiH, No. 12/04, Dec. 1, 2004. 
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Tribunal for Lebanon.38 A seventh court, the Iraqi High Tribunal was established 
in 2003,39 but there is debate as to whether this tribunal can be categorized as a 
hybrid court,40 because, inter alia, it did not require, nor did it ever appoint, any 
international judges.41 Debate over classification of the Iraqi High Tribunal 
illuminates a significant difficulty in the literature on hybrid courts. It goes without 
saying that the “promise of hybrid courts” cannot be realized without 
understanding their defining characteristics or features.42 Rather, “omitting this 
initial step” will invariably lead to disappointed expectations.43 A critical first stage 
before unconsciously accepting the drive back towards hybrid courts is, therefore, 
a technical, yet surprisingly demanding one: defining what is a “hybrid court.”  
Scholars have generally sought to define hybrid courts through deduction. 
By surveying the field of existing or proposed courts, it is hoped that the lowest 
common denominator of attributes can be identified.44 This approach has an 
attractive simplicity about it, but can create problems. For example, Sarah 
Nouwen has noted that this methodology leaves two fundamental issues 
unaddressed: Do these common characteristics override the significant 
distinctions between what may otherwise be described as sui generis courts; and 
which of the common characteristics are shared but are not necessarily defining?45 
However, there is a third issue bound up in the framing of the question, for the 
breadth of courts surveyed will impact the number of common characteristics. In 
part, this may be why the most exhaustive examination of these tribunals found 
that there is “no comprehensive definition” of a hybrid tribunal.46 
Instead, Sarah Williams has distilled “several defining features.” Williams 
concludes that hybrid tribunals: (1) primarily serve a criminal (as opposed to a 
civil, administrative or investigatory) judicial function; (2) operate for a limited 
duration as an ad hoc or temporary response to a specific situation; (3) provide for 
the possibility of participation by international judges, who do not necessarily 
                                                 
38  S.C. Res. 1757, 5685th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). 
39  Iraqi Governing Council Decree of 10 December 2003, Establishing A Special Tribunal (2003). 
40  See Nouwen, supra note 18, at 192; Sylvia de Bertodano, Were There More Acceptable Alternatives to the 
Iraqi High Tribunal?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 294 (2007). Cf. Williams, supra note 18, at 109–20. 
41  See Williams supra note 18, at 117, though international experts did provide assistance to the Trial 
Chambers and Appeal Chambers.  
42  Dickinson, supra note 12, at 295. 
43  Nouwen, supra note 18, at 193.  
44  See, for example, Jann K. Kleffner & André Nollkaemper, The Relationship Between Internationalized 
Courts and National Courts, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA 
LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA, supra note 20, at 359; Higonnet, supra note 18, at 
356; Williams, supra note 18.  
45  Nouwen, supra note 18, at 193.  
46  Williams, supra note 18, at 249. Williams includes the Iraqi High Tribunal.  
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compose a majority on the bench; (4) may be partially financed by international 
actors; (5) enjoy material jurisdiction over a mix of international and national 
crimes; and (6) involve a party other than the affected state, whether the U.N., a 
regional organization, or another state(s).47 On the other hand, Nouwen, who does 
not include the Iraqi High Tribunal, argues that mixed composition of judges is 
“the only defining commonality.”48 While all hybrid courts “share [additional] 
features,” those features are “not necessarily defining.”49 
It is not surprising that these courts defy simple definition. International 
criminal law is a creature of international politics, and hybrid tribunals in particular 
owe their genesis to a complex set of circumstances. These courts are not the 
product of “grand institutional design”50 but “forced compromises and haphazard 
bargains”51 to fill a “functional need”52; “impunity gaps in emergency situations.”53 
Their establishment requires a “serendipitous” and “unique” convergence of 
international and national aims.54 Cassese has suggested that, at a minimum, the 
following factors need to present themselves: (1) geopolitical concerns and 
political will favor the establishment and financing of a tribunal; (2) but not a 
purely international court; (3) the national judiciary must be, at least, partly 
available in order to rely to some extent on national courts; and (4) the affected 
state, for nationalistic and sovereignty reasons, demands involvement in the 
tribunal.55  
In some respects, a precise definition beyond an agreed upon set of key 
characteristics is unnecessary. In a more abstract designation, Bruch invokes 
hybridity’s biological and botanical origins, “the intermingling of two previously 
separate entities (or species), forming a new and distinct creation.”56 It is this 
“blending” of international and national features that most characterizes these 
                                                 
47  Id. at 201–52.  
48  Nouwen, supra note 18, at 213.  
49  Id. These features include: their location in the affected state; involvement by the UN; no coercive 
enforcement powers over third party states; and a more precarious financial model. See id.  
50  Dickinson, supra note 12, at 296. 
51  McAuliffe, supra note 17, at 2. 
52  Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of 
International Law or its Fragmentation?, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 929, 944 (2004). 
53  McAuliffe, supra note 17, at 2. 
54  Tom Perriello & Marieka Wierda, Lessons from the Deployment of International Judges and Prosecutors in 
Kosovo 12–14 (2006), INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://www.ictj.org/sites/ 
default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Courts-Study-2006-English_0.pdf. 
55  Antonio Cassese, The Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against International 
Criminality, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST 
TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA, supra note 20, at 1, 5. 
56  Bruch, supra note 23, at 5. 
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tribunals.57 But hybridity is a many-splintered thing: “A tribunal may be hybrid in 
its origins (created through domestic and international processes), its mandate 
(splicing together domestic and international law) or its composition (combining 
domestic and ‘international’ members).”58  
This general connotation is the sense in which I use the term, for there is a 
rich diversity of internationalized criminal tribunals. Particular hybrid and 
internationalized criminal courts can be placed along a spectrum ranging, at the 
one end, from purely international criminal courts, such as the ICC, to purely 
domestic criminal courts at the other.59 Whether they are established 
independently of the domestic court system or are based within that legal system,60 
these criminal courts are joint ventures between the local and international 
communities. 
It is the blending of the international and national that has most attracted 
proponents. This blending has been hailed as offering the “potential to address 
. . . serious drawbacks of both international and domestic tribunals.”61 Compared 
to purely domestic or purely international trials, hybrid courts may offer enhanced 
sociological legitimacy, further capacity building efforts, and promote deeper 
norm-penetration.62 In practice, many of these claims have proven overblown. 
For one, securing enduring political and financial commitment on both the 
international and national side has been difficult for almost every tribunal, and the 
tribunals have proven just as costly and lengthy as the ad hoc courts they were 
supposed to replace. Nevertheless, conceptually these courts do still hold merit, 
for the presence of local judges can enhance the sociological legitimacy of the 
court. 
The potential for greater sociological legitimacy is an understated benefit of 
hybrid courts. To date, the uneven enforcement of international criminal law has 
enabled a small group of African leaders “to present the ICC as a new form of 
                                                 
57  Higonnet, supra note 18, at 352; Dickinson supra note 12, at 295; Williams, supra note 18, at 8; 
Dickinson, supra note 18, at 1059; McAuliffe, supra note 17, at 4; William Burke-White, International 
Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963, 974 (2004). 
58  Bruch, supra note 23, at 6. 
59  See Williams, supra note 18, at 249–52; Cesare P.R. Romano, Preface, in INTERNATIONALIZED 
CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA, supra note 20, at x. 
60  See Williams, supra note 18, at 250–51. Williams makes a distinction, arguing that tribunals 
established outside the domestic legal system should be designated “hybrid” tribunals, whereas 
courts legally constituted within the domestic legal system are “internationalized” tribunals. For the 
purposes of this paper, this distinction is unnecessary. 
61  Dickinson, supra note 12, at 310. 
62  Id. at 306. The availability of victim participation may also enhance the legitimacy of the court in 
the eyes of the affected population. See generally Harry Hobbs, Victim Participation in International 
Criminal Proceedings: Problems and Potential Solutions in Implementing an Effective and Vital Component of 
Justice, 49 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 9–12 (2014). 
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imperialism.”63 In the last few years, these accusations have increased. In 
December 2014, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni claimed that the court is 
“a vessel for oppressing Africa” and called on African nations to “get out of that 
court of the West.”64 Before the case against him collapsed, Kenyan President 
Kenyatta named the ICC the “toy of declining imperial powers,”65 while his 
Foreign Minister chastised the Court for treating Africans “like toddlers.”66 
Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has gone further, complaining 
of “unfair” and “unacceptable” treatment,67 and asserting that the Court has 
denigrated into “some kind of race hunting.”68 
The characterisation of the ICC as anti-African has rhetorical weight, but is 
not supported by the facts.69 Nevertheless, that these claims have resonated 
throughout Africa is not surprising. International law has a complex relationship 
with colonialism,70 and its continued focus on African leaders does, superficially, 
create problems. In balancing sovereignty with accountability, hybrid courts could 
chart a path out of this mess and disarm the imperialism critique of international 
criminal law. However, an inadequate theorization of hybridity that denies the 
importance of sociological legitimacy and unconscious belittling of domestic 
actors will torpedo the potential benefits of hybrid courts. Ultimately, the 
                                                 
63  Elise Keppler, Managing Setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa, 55 J. Afr. L. 1, 6 (2011). 
64  Ugandan Leader Calls on Africa to Quit the ICC, ALJAZEERA (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com 
/news/africa/2014/12/ugandan-leader-calls-africa-quit-icc-201412121712353977.html.  
65  African Union Urges ICC to Defer Uhuru Kenyatta Case, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24506006. 
66  Michael Birnbaum, African Leaders Complain of Bias at ICC as Kenya Trials Get Underway, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/african-
leaders-complain-of-bias-at-icc-as-kenya-trials-are-underway/2013/12/05/0c52fc7a-56cb-11e3-
bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html. 
67  Id. 
68  African Leaders Accuse ICC of “Race Hunt”, ALJAZEERA (May. 28, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com 
/news/africa/2013/05/201352722331270466.html. 
69   Scholars have recognized that despite the ICC being a criminal court, it should not and cannot 
focus solely on criminal prosecution: See, for example, William Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: 
The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Criminal Justice, 49 
HARV. INT’L L. J. 53 (2008). As an institution with a potentially universal jurisdiction and a decidedly 
limited capacity, its success or otherwise should be measured more broadly. For example, through 
preliminary examinations, the Court has the potential to monitor developments by threatening 
intervention: Nirej Sekhon, Complementarity and Post-Coloniality, 27 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 799, 800 
(2013) (arguing that the Court can “educate, persuade, and prod” states). This strategy has most 
clearly been exemplified in Colombia, where the protracted peace negotiations between government 
forces, paramilitary and rebel armed forces has been under preliminary examination since June 2004. 
70  See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2007); See also CRITICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION (Christine Schwöbel ed., 2014). 
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particular politico-legal context and relative bargaining power of the affected state 
and the international community will determine the exact modality of each court.71 
Whether or not the presence of international judges is a required element of 
properly defined hybrid courts, I argue that sound, principled reasons dictate that 
all hybrid courts should be comprised of a mix of international and local judges. 
This argument will be developed further below. 
III.   THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR REFLECTION AND 
SOCIOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy is the “quality that leads people (or states) to accept authority—
independent of coercion, self-interest, or rational persuasion—because of a 
general sense that the authority is justified.”72 Legitimacy therefore has normative 
and sociological dimensions:73 a hybrid court may be normatively legitimate 
because it was established by municipal law after agreement between a state and 
the U.N.,74 and it may be sociologically legitimate because the people of the 
affected state accept or perceive it as justified.75 Legitimacy is particularly crucial 
for hybrid courts.76 As a practical matter, absent any police force, these courts are 
                                                 
71  For example, that a majority of national judges sit on the ECCC owes much to the superior 
bargaining power of Cambodia once the General Assembly forced the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs 
back to the negotiating table. G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess. U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/57/228A (Feb. 27, 2003). 
72  Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 600 (1999). See also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER 
OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 16 (Detler Vagts ed., 1990) (“A partial definition of legitimacy 
adapted to the international system could be formulated thus: a property of a rule or rule-making 
institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
73  Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 405, 405 (2006). 
74  See, for example, the ECCC: Khmer Rouge Trials, G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. GAOR 57th Sess, Agenda 
item 109(b), U.N. Doc A/57/806 (May 22, 2003); Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period 
of Democratic Kampuchea (2001), amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004). 
75  Bodansky, supra note 72, at 601. See also MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION 382 (1964); Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 
379, 387–89 (1999). 
76  Yuval Shany identifies the limited degree of legitimacy enjoyed by international judicial bodies as 
having hampered the impact of international criminal proceedings on domestic criminal 
proceedings in mass atrocity cases. See Yuval Shany, How Can International Criminal Courts Have a 
Greater Impact on National Criminal Proceedings? Lessons From the First Two Decades of International Criminal 
Justice in Operation, 46 ISR. L. REV. 431, 449–50 (2013). Legitimacy is, of course, a recurrent problem 
of all international adjudicative bodies. See generally Armin von Bogandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose 
Name? An Investigation of International Courts’ Public Authority and its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR. J. 
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“especially vulnerable to being ignored.”77 However, more significantly, the total 
breakdown of civic trust, both horizontally and vertically, that characterizes states 
transitioning from authoritarianism or mass atrocity severely weakens the 
prospect of acceptance of authority—particularly where a sizeable number of 
people may disagree with the court’s judgment. If institutions are not considered 
legitimate, social regulation is more difficult and costly, and may be impossible in 
transitioning states. Moreover, without legitimacy, the promised benefits of hybrid 
courts will be lost. 
The general acceptance of judicial decisions as “justified” relies on public 
confidence, not simply coercion. As Section IV will demonstrate, however, 
international criminal tribunals struggle with questions of legitimacy. What can be 
done? I argue that the principle of fair reflection may provide a firmer conceptual 
base for the selection of judges on hybrid tribunals and has the potential to 
enhance the sociological legitimacy of these courts.78 
An emergent soft law norm, the principle of fair reflection has been affirmed 
in numerous international instruments,79 and operationalized in many domestic 
and international judicial appointment procedures,80 including, in part, the ICC.81 
The essence of the principle is neatly distilled in Article 2.15 of the Mt. Scopus 
International Standards on Judicial Independence, which requires that “the 
process and standards of judicial selection shall give due consideration to ensuring 
a fair reflection by the judiciary of the society in all its aspects.”82 In short, judges 
should mirror the society over which they exercise jurisdiction. However, 
international law requires that individuals receive a “fair and public hearing by a 
                                                 
INT'L L. 7 (2012); Marlies Glasius, Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?, 23 
EUR. J. INT'L L. 43 (2012). 
77  Nienke Grossman, Sex Representation on the Bench and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts, 11 
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 643, 644 (2011).  
78  For a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between sociological legitimacy and international 
criminal courts, see Harry Hobbs, Towards a Principled Justification for the Mixed Composition of Hybrid 
International Criminal Tribunals (Working Paper, Oct. 30, 2015).  
79  See, for example, First World Conference on the Independence of Justice, Montreal Universal Declaration 
on the Independence of Justice, art 2.13 (June 10, 1983); The Burgh House Principles on the 
Independence of the International Judiciary, art 2.2 (2005); International Project of Judicial 
Independence of the International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace, Mt 
Scopus International Standards on Judicial Independence, art 2.15 (March 19, 2008). 
80  See, for example, S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 174(2); Constitutional Reform Act., 2005, c. 4 §§ 63–64 
(U.K.); U.N. Charter annex, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 31. 
81  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9, art. 36(8) (July 17, 
1998) [hereinafter ICCSt]. See infra Section IV(B). 
82  Mt. Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence, supra note 79, at art. 2.15. 
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competent, independent and impartial tribunal.”83 If judges are to be independent 
and impartial, then how are we to speak of mirroring societal interests? Is the 
principle of fair reflection at odds with the fundamental principle of judicial 
impartiality? 
This is a significant concern, and it is therefore important to distinguish 
reflection from representation. Representation can be defined broadly as meaning 
“the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present 
literally or in fact.”84 More specifically, it can be divided between the concepts of 
“acting for” and “standing for.” The principle of fair reflection does not require a 
judge to act for any interest. This is consistent with both municipal and 
international law, which requires that a judge not “represent” the interests of any 
particular individual; rather, a judge is said to impartially act for “the law” or 
“justice.” 
The second understanding of representation mentioned above, “standing 
for,” can be further delineated between symbolic and descriptive representation.85 
A few examples may help elucidate this distinction. Take the image of Lady 
Justice—blindfolded, balancing a set of scales, and wielding a sword. For Western 
audiences, this image symbolizes both “the law” generally and “the law’s” critical 
elements:86 her blindfold represents objectivity, the scales represent the weighing 
of evidence, and the sword represents punishment.87 On the other hand, a map 
does not symbolize a nation, but descriptively represents the physical 
configuration of a country drawn to scale.88 When we speak of fair reflection, we 
mean descriptive representation. This concept requires a body reflective of 
society: “an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large.”89 It is this 
descriptive notion of representation that underpins the fair reflection principle, 
though note that “fair” reflection does not require exactly proportional 
representation. 
The principle of fair reflection suggests that a judiciary reflective of society 
will be more likely to be perceived by that society as legitimate or justified. This is 
                                                 
83  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at art. 14(1) (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (emphasis added); Human Rights Committee, 90th Sess., General 
Comment No. 32, art. 14: Right to Equality Before the Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/32, at ¶3 (2007).  
84  HANNA FENCHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 8–9 (1967). 
85  Id. at 60, 92. 
86  Daniel S. Lev, The Lady and the Banyan Tree: Civil-Law Change in Indonesia, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 282, 282 
(1965).  
87  See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1754–64 (1987). 
88  See PITKIN, supra note 84, at 60. 
89  Id. 
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said to occur in two ways: first, the very presence of diverse judges will lead to 
greater support of the institution by different communities; and second, the 
diversity of experience, knowledge, expertise and outlook that heterogeneous 
judges will bring to the case at issue may lead to more well-rounded decisions that 
command greater support throughout the entire community. These arguments 
have some force. Public trust and confidence is of critical importance for the 
judiciary. As the European Court of Human Rights has noted, a court “must enjoy 
public confidence if it is to be successful in carrying out its duties.”90 The risk is 
that any institution that fails to reflect the “make-up of the society from which it 
is drawn will sooner or later lose the confidence of that society.”91 Complementing 
this rationale is the second argument, which highlights the agency of diverse 
judges. While a socially or culturally homogenous judiciary comprised of 
eminently qualified individuals is capable of producing sound decisions, a more 
heterogeneous court made up of equally eminently qualified and skilled individuals 
will likely produce better decisions.92 For example, the lack of female judges on 
international courts may have contributed to the long struggle to classify rape and 
sexual violence as war crimes.93 
However, it is not correct to suggest that a diverse bench per se will enhance 
public confidence or that an individual judge, by virtue of her experiences, will 
approach a particular case in a distinct manner.94 As many have remarked, the 
years of legal education and training required of judges may have a homogenizing 
effect on their attitudes, perceptions, and outlook, irrespective of gender or 
culture.95 This is an important reminder when extrapolating the principle of fair 
reflection to hybrid courts. The presence of local judges may not be enough in 
                                                 
90  Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 313 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 13 (1995).  
91  Simon Evans & John Williams, Appointing Australian Judges: A New Model, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 295, 
300 (2008). 
92  On the idea that deliberation between conflicting views is the best means for discovering the truth, 
see JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 20 (1859) (“it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that 
the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.”). 
93  Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶598 (Sept. 2, 1998). See KELLY DAWN 
ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 
(1997); Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into 
International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL L. J. 217, 225 (2001). 
94  It is, of course, important to distinguish between the legitimacy of a court as an institution and the 
quality of individual decisions of that court. The quality of an individual decision may be assessed 
via many measures, including formal, procedural and substantive metrics. See, for example, QUALITY 
PROJECT OF THE COURTS IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ROVANIEMI, 
FINLAND, EVALUATION OF THE QUALITY OF ADJUDICATION IN COURTS OF LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
PROPOSED QUALITY BENCHMARKS (2006). The legitimacy of a court, on the other hand, relies on a 
slow, steady and accumulative process of “quality” decisions. 
95  Regina Graycar, The Gender of Judgments: An Introduction, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL 
DEBATES 262, 268–69 (Margaret Thornton ed., 1995).  
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and of itself to ground legitimacy. A local judge may be from a particular cultural 
or ideological community and her presence may in fact diminish public confidence 
and legitimacy in the institution as a whole. This warning demonstrates that the 
principle of fair reflection in domestic and hybrid courts must always cede to the 
traditional integral judicial qualities of impartiality and professional skill. In 
practice, it requires that of two candidates with the requisite skill and 
qualifications, the candidate whom would enhance the descriptively representative 
character of the judiciary should be preferred. The international standards 
recognize this and are careful to acknowledge that the principle should cede to 
issues of professional skill. Article 11.2 of the comprehensive Mt. Scopus 
Standards provides: 
While procedures for nomination, election and appointment should consider 
fair representation of different geographic regions and the principal legal 
systems, as appropriate, as well as of female and male judges, appropriate 
personal and professional qualifications must be the overriding consideration 
in the nomination, election and appointment of judges.96 
Notwithstanding these caveats, the principle of fair reflection offers a strong 
conceptual base for the selection of judges for hybrid tribunals. The principle 
suggests that if hybrid tribunals are to be accepted as legitimate and are to realize 
their potential for (limited) capacity building and norm penetration, the 
composition of these courts must be a fair reflection of the society in question. 
As international crimes strike at two societies—the local and the global—both 
local and international judges must necessarily staff hybrid courts to be legitimate. 
This much is uncontroversial. However, as Section V will show, there is no 
homogenous international community, and both principled and pragmatic reasons 
militate in favor of defining international judges on international tribunals with 
greater particularity,97 including attentiveness to regional, legal tradition, and 
linguistic dimensions. Considering contextual factors in the appointment of 
international judges is critical to ensuring a clearer connection between the court 
and the affected community, offering greater scope for the promise of hybrid 
courts to be realized. However, before that, Section IV will examine the link 
between local judges and sociological legitimacy in a spectrum of international 
tribunals.  
IV.  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND 
LOCAL JUDGES 
It is only recently—most recently with the CAR Special Criminal Court—
that international criminal tribunals have guaranteed the presence of local judges 
on the bench. This is curious as the earliest incantations of these tribunals and 
                                                 
96  Mt. Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence, supra note 79, at art. 11.2. 
97  Bruch, supra note 23, at 36. 
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international criminal law as a field appear to have recognized the importance of 
local actors taking a leading role in the trial of their own war criminals. This 
Section will trace this development, examining in detail the ad hoc tribunals, the 
ICC, the SCSL, and the ECCC. It will begin, however, with a short history. 
The establishment of an international court to try political leaders accused 
of international crimes was first proposed in the aftermath of the First World War. 
The Commission of Responsibilities, tasked with investigating the causes of the 
war, recommended the creation of a “High Tribunal” consisting of twenty-two 
judges, three from each of the major allied powers and an additional six from 
other countries.98 Although this recommendation was not adopted at the Paris 
Peace Conference, Articles 227-230 of the Treaty of Versailles did envisage the 
arrest and prosecution of German officials, including Kaiser Wilhelm II. 
However, the German government refused to extradite some nine hundred 
German citizens and offered to try them themselves—a suggestion that the Allies 
accepted. Although the Leipzig War Crimes Trials were regarded as a failure—
only twelve individuals were prosecuted and only seven were convicted—it did 
represent the first time that a European country “had agreed to try its own after a 
major war.”99 
Following the Second World War, the Allies succeeded in establishing two 
ad hoc courts to try the leaders of Germany and Japan. The International Military 
Tribunals for Nuremberg and for the Far East were concerned primarily with 
normative rather than sociological legitimacy.100 It “is striking” that neither 
Tribunal contained local judges, but rather, like the proposed High Tribunal of 
the First World War, consisted entirely of representatives of the victorious 
powers.101 In Nuremberg, the Court was comprised of eight judges, all appointed 
                                                 
98  Memorandum by the U.N. Secretary-General on the establishment of a Criminal Chamber of the 
ICJ, Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/7/Rev.1, 7 (1949). 
99  Mark Lewis, Judicial Resistance? War Crime Trials After World War I, OUPBLOG (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://blog.oup.com/2015/01/world-war-one-war-crimes-trials/#sthash.SvUVHAfe.dpuf; see 
also MARK LEWIS, THE BIRTH OF THE NEW JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT, 1919-1950 59 (2015). 
100  In fact, Article 3 of the Nuremberg Statute prohibited the Prosecutor, the defendants, or their 
counsel from challenging the Tribunal or the Judges. See Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg annex, Nuremberg Rules, in Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the 
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, art. 3 (signed and entered into force Aug. 
8, 1945). See Gordon Ireland, Ex Post Facto from Rome to Tokyo, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 27 (1948), for critical 
contemporary comments concerning the legality of each Tribunal. 
101  Antonio Cassese, The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of International 
Criminal Justice, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 491, 495 (2012). 
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by the Allies.102 However, significantly, the situation was slightly different at the 
Tokyo Tribunal, which was comprised of eleven judges, nine from the signatories 
to the Instrument of Surrender, as well as one each from India and the 
Philippines.103 Although neither India nor the Philippines was a great power, the 
U.S. State Department favored introducing judges from these two countries on 
the basis that “since the Tribunal will be trying Japanese war criminals, it is 
believed that it would strengthen the Tribunal, in the eyes of the peoples of South 
Asia, if at least one additional Asiatic nation is represented.”104 It is trite to remark 
that international criminal law has developed significantly since Nuremberg, but 
the gradual yet unconscious development of the principle of fair reflection in 
international criminal law is particularly noteworthy. 
A.  The Ad Hoc  Tribunals—No Local Judges 
During the Cold War, concerns surrounding the normative legitimacy of the 
International Military Tribunals (“IMTs”) and realpolitik difficulties stymied the 
establishment of new international criminal tribunals.105 It was not until the early 
1990s, amid credible claims of war crimes and genocide committed in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, that the international community was moved to act. On 
February 22, 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 808 establishing 
a tribunal to “prosecute ‘persons responsible for violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991.’”106 On November 8, 1994, U.N. Security Council Resolution 955 
established an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for 
“genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of Rwanda.”107 
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes do not set out extensive prescriptive 
requirements concerning the composition of the court. Judges at the ICTY and 
ICTR “shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity.”108 
                                                 
102  Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, art. 2 (Aug. 8, 1945). There were, however, 
really only four (primary) judges and four alternate judges. The US, the UK, France, and Russia 
appointed two judges each.  
103  Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 2 (Jan. 19, 1946), as amended 
Apr. 25, 1946. 
104  Elizabeth S. Kopelman, Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War 
Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 373, 390–91 (1991).  
105  For a review of a series of books chronicling the history of international criminal law, see Frédéric 
Mégret, The Politics of International Criminal Justice, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1261, 1264–65 (2002). 
106  S.C. Res. 808 para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).  
107  S.C. Res. 955 para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
108  Statute of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 13(1) (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter 
ICTYSt]; Statute of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, art. 13(1) (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTRSt]. 
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They are appointed from a list of fifty-four nominated candidates chosen by the 
Security Council, “taking due account of the adequate representation of the 
principal legal systems of the world and bearing in mind the importance of 
equitable geographical distribution.”109 As with the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs, 
no judges of the affected states have sat on the bench. 
Analysis of the Report of the Secretary-General on the proposed Yugoslav 
Tribunal and the verbatim record of the Security Council meeting that 
unanimously adopted the Statute, suggests that the composition of the Court was 
not seriously considered.110 The Report provides very little detail, simply stating 
that the Tribunal will be comprised of eleven judges “no 2 of whom may be 
nationals of the same State”111 and “taking due account of the adequate 
representation of the principal legal systems of the world.”112 Upon adopting the 
draft Statute, few members of the Security Council mentioned the makeup of 
judges who would compose the Court. Madeline Albright, the U.S. representative, 
was a notable exception, recording her government’s determination “to see that 
women jurists sit on the Tribunal.”113 Nevertheless, the closest that we get to a 
debate over the composition are indirect references to the Tribunal judging “on 
behalf of humanity in its entirety”114 or answering calls for “justice [to] be done 
by the international community.”115 These broad statements could perhaps be 
understood as requiring a bench of international rather than national judges, 
though it is more likely that the representatives were referring to a figurative moral 
basis for international action. 
Debate leading to the establishment of the ICTR also ignored the 
composition of the court, focusing instead on the simple need to expeditiously 
establish a new tribunal or extend the jurisdiction of the ICTY to cover the alleged 
                                                 
109  ICTYSt, supra note 108, at art. 13(2)(c); ICTRSt, supra note 108, at art. 12.3(c).  
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321, 363 (2012).  
111  U.N. S.C., Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S.C. Res. 808 (1993), U.N. 
Doc. S/25704, 18 at para. 72 (May 3, 1993). 
112  Id. at 19 [75]. 
113  U.N. S.C., Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth 
Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, at 14 (May 25, 1993) (Ms. Albright, U.S.). The U.K. Representative, 
Sir David Hannay, was the only other representative who specifically mentioned the judges, though 
his comments were limited to noting the importance that all members of the Tribunal have 
“considerable practical experience in the field of criminal prosecution.” Id. at 18. 
114  Id. at 11 (Mr. Mérimée, France). 
115  Id. at 41 (Mr. Yañez Barnuevo, Spain). 
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atrocities in Rwanda.116 A Commission of Experts, tasked with investigating the 
situation and with responsibility to make recommendations to the Security 
Council, appears to have understood the value of sociological legitimacy but failed 
to comprehend its workable application. The Commission noted the value of a 
court “more responsive to the needs of the local community” and accepted that a 
court more “familiar to the local community” might produce judgments of 
“greater and more immediate symbolic force.”117 However, the Commission 
considered that “independence, objectivity and impartiality,” among other factors, 
necessitated that trials be conducted “a certain measure of distance” from the 
affected community.118 In reaching this conclusion, the Commission seems to 
have overlooked the possibility of a compromise position: local judges sitting on 
the court. 
The absence of a detailed background examination of this potential proposal 
may explain why representatives on the Security Council in large part failed to 
discuss the composition of the proposed Tribunal. Following the adoption of 
Resolution 955, the U.K. representative reiterated the importance that judges on 
the Tribunal have “considerable practical experience in criminal law and 
procedure”119 and the representative from France expressed “in advance [his] full 
confidence in the judges.”120 However, not all members of the Council spoke in 
such generalities. The comments of the representative from Argentina are 
particularly instructive, stating that “in the specific case of Rwanda, we believe 
that those to be appointed should, in the main, come from continental legal 
systems.”121 This is a point that will be addressed in Section V. 
                                                 
116  In reports delivered by the Secretary-General and the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, no mention 
is made of the composition of the proposed tribunal. See U.N. S.C., Report of the Secretary-General 
on the Establishment of the Commission of Experts Pursuant to Paragraph 1 of Security Council 
Resolution 935 (1994) of 1 July 1994, U.N. Doc. S/1994/879 (July 26, 1994) and U.N. Secretary-
General, Letter dated July 29, 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/1994/906 (July 29, 1994); see also Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Comm’n on Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (June 28, 1994) (by Mr. R. Degni-Ségui); Note by the Secretary-
General, Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1157, annex I and annex II (Oct. 
13, 1994).  
117  U.N. Secretary General, Letter dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, Annex: Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of 
Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), U.N Doc. 
S/1994/1125, ¶ 134 (Oct. 4, 1994).  
118  Id. ¶ 137. 
119  U.N. S.C., 3453d mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (Sir David Hannay, United 
Kingdom). 
120  Id. at 4 (Mr. Mérimée, France). 
121  Id. at 8 (Ms. Cañas, Argentina). Note further that the representative from Rwanda expressed its 
concern that “certain countries, which . . . took a very active part in the civil war in Rwanda” may 
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The experience of the ad hoc Tribunals lends weight to the argument for 
including local judges on hybrid criminal courts. Recent empirical work by Jelena 
Subotić demonstrates that the ICTY has failed spectacularly to break down ethnic 
narratives concerning the conflict, such that it now appears impossible to do so.122 
Subotić’s study suggests that attitudes have not drastically changed from a 2008 
Balkan Monitor survey. That survey reported that in Albania (69%) and Kosovo 
(68%) support for the Court is high. However, only 42% of Bosnians reported 
that the tribunal served the interests of the region, and in Macedonia (36%), 
Croatia (25%), and Serbia (19%) support was even lower.123 Although Subotić 
acknowledges that the absence of a “broader transitional justice framework in the 
former Yugoslavia,” and not the ICTY itself, is the primary cause of this failure,124 
one cannot help but wonder how the narrative may have been shaped by the 
presence of local judges. In addition to the benefits that come from a socially and 
culturally heterogeneous judiciary, the presence of local judges would likely have 
led to both the ICTY and ICTR’s work being translated into local languages far 
earlier,125 and therefore more effective communication with the affected states’ 
citizens.126 
From the very beginning of the Tribunals, questions were raised about the 
lack of local representation. Muhamed Sacirbey, Bosnia’s ambassador to the U.N., 
strenuously argued that “[i]t is absurd that most of the victims are Muslim, yet 
they have no representatives on the Tribunal.”127 Likewise, José Alvarez has 
questioned the absence of Rwandan judges on the ICTR on the basis of the 
principle of fair reflection, noting that “having judges who come from the local 
                                                 
“propose candidates for judges and participate in their election.” Id. at 15 (Mr. Bakuramutsa, 
Rwanda). 
122  Jelena Subotić, Legitimacy, Scope, and Conflicting Claims on the ICTY: In the Aftermath of Gotovina, 
Haradinaj and Perišić, 13 J. OF HUM. RTS. 170, 172 (2014); see also Janine Natalya Clark, The ICTY and 
Reconciliation in Croatia: A Case Study of Vukovar, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 397 (2012). 
123  GALLUP BALKAN MONITOR, INSIGHTS AND PERCEPTIONS: VOICES OF THE BALKANS 47 (2008). 
124  Subotić, supra note 122, at 172, 175–77. Of course, there are myriad numbers of factors that have 
weakened the ICTY’s ability to effectuate reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia; the absence of 
local judges is but one.  
125  The ICTY did not translate its judgments into languages spoken in the former Yugoslavia until 
1999. See DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, SHRINKING THE SPACE FOR 
DENIAL: THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN SERBIA 22 (2008). Richard Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor 
of the ICTY, argued that it would be too expensive to translate the Court’s documents into local 
languages because there are too many of them. See Higonnet, supra note 18, at 365. The ICTR did 
not translate judgments into Kinyarwanda until 2000. Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda: The Promises 
and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 950, 956 (2005).  
126  David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and 
Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 7, 14 (2002). 
127  Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legitimacy of International Courts?, 12 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 647, 670 (2012).  
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community may itself be determinative of the legitimacy of these processes,”128 
and asked his readers to “[c]onsider the impact, on both perceptions and results, 
if the ICTR were to include a Hutu and a Tutsi judge.”129 Indeed it is likely that 
the lack of Serbian judges on the ICTY has contributed to a feeling amongst 
Serbians that the court is biased.130 A judiciary that reflected the ethnic and cultural 
background of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda may have been a difficult 
practical exercise, but it is likely to have brought enhanced sociological legitimacy 
to the institution and may well have succeeded in breaking down contradictory 
ethnic narratives. 
B.  The International Criminal Court—Local Judges Not 
Guaranteed but Possible 
The International Criminal Court was formally established on July 1, 2002 
upon the 60th ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
This followed an extensive drafting and negotiating process, culminating in the 
Rome Conference of June 1998. Analysis of the records of this conference and 
the drafting history of the Statute indicates a mixed appreciation of the importance 
of sociological legitimacy to the Court. 
Delegates at the Rome Conference agreed that the judges of the ICC must 
be “carefully selected”131 and “highly qualified.”132 The Court’s “moral authority 
would derive from its impartiality and credibility,”133 and it was therefore 
“essential to ensure that the procedures for selecting members of the Court . . . 
had the confidence of the world community.”134 Article 36 of the Rome Statute 
governs the qualification and appointment of ICC judges. It provides that judges 
must be “of high moral character, impartiality and integrity,”135 and either have 
                                                 
128  José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 416 
(1999).  
129  Id. at 451.  
130  Jelena Subotić, Expanding the Scope of Post-Conflict Justice: Individual, State and Societal Responsibility For 
Mass Atrocity, 48 J. PEACE RES. 157, 158 (2011).  
131  U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Whole (Rome, June 15–
July 17, 1998), Official Records Vol. II, 3d plen. mtg., at ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3 
(June 16, 1998) (Mr. Ferencz, Observer for Pace Peace Center) [hereinafter U.N. ICC Conference]. 
132  Id. 2d plen. mtg., at ¶ 35 (Mr. Lloyd, United Kingdom). 
133  Id. 14th plen. mtg., at ¶ 34 (Mr. Scheffer, U.S.). 
134  Id., 10th plen. mtg., at ¶ 11 (Mr. Skibsted, Denmark). 
135  ICCSt, supra note 81, at art. 36(3)(a). 
Hybrid Tribunals Hobbs 
Winter 2016 505 
competence in criminal law and procedure or international law, as well as 
experience in legal practice.136 
However, Article 36(8) of the Rome Statute suggests that the legitimacy of 
the Court is not solely tied to the professional quality of its personnel: 
(a) The States Parties shall, in the selection of judges, take into account the 
need, within the membership of the Court, for: 
(i) The representation of the principal legal systems of the world; 
(ii) Equitable geographical representation; and 
(iii) A fair representation of female and male judges 
(b) States Parties shall also take into account the need to include judges with 
legal expertise on specific issues, including, but not limited to, violence 
against women and children. 
This provision has received little attention in the commentaries on the Rome 
Statute,137 but is critical in assessing how the principle of fair reflection can assist 
the composition of international criminal courts. Significantly, some delegates at 
the Rome Conference emphasized the link between equitable geographic 
representation (or distribution) and sociological legitimacy. The Ukrainian 
delegate, for example, argued that “equitable geographical distribution would have 
a direct impact on States’ trust in the judges.”138 The Chinese delegate agreed, 
suggesting that the Court’s impartiality “would depend on” the representative 
nature of the Court.139 The delegates from Burundi and Korea offered more 
instrumental justifications for equitable geographic distribution, suggesting that it 
was “essential in recruiting judges with a balance of viewpoints,”140 presumably to 
enhance the quality of the judgments. However, all delegates stopped short of 
suggesting that a national of an affected state should sit on the particular case. 
This hesitation may have been due to the primacy of the ad hoc tribunals in the 
minds of the delegates. 
                                                 
136  Id. at art. 36(3)(b). 
137  Otto Triffterer’s Commentary devotes two lines to article 36(8) simply noting that it is “very evident” 
that candidates will be sought from “from all regions and main legal systems of the world and to 
aim for a balanced representation of women and men.” See Zhu Wen-qi & Sureta Chana, Article 36: 
Qualifications, Nomination and Election of Judges, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 941, 947 at para. 11 
(Otto Triffterer ed., C.H.Beck, Hart & Nomos 2d ed., 2008) (1999). Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta 
& John Jones’s Commentary fares slightly better, devoting three paragraphs. John R.W.D. Jones, 
Composition of the Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY, Vol. I 235, 254–55 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).  
138  U.N. ICC Conference, supra note 131, 15th plen mtg., at para. 3 (Ms. Pavlikovska, Ukraine). 
139  U.N. ICC Conference, supra note 131, 14th plen. mtg., at ¶ 72 (Ms. Li Ting, China). 
140  U.N. ICC Conference, supra note 131, 15th plen. mtg., at ¶ 30 (Ms. Rwamo, Burundi); see also U.N. 
ICC Conference, supra note 131, 15th plen. mtg., at ¶ 4 (Mr. Chun Young-wook, Republic of 
Korea). 
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Many of the delegates at the Rome Conference emphasized that the 
operation of the ICTY and the ICTR could offer lessons for the establishment of 
the ICC.141 In particular, the Senegalese delegate argued that the lack of female 
judges on those courts “hampered” the Tribunals when dealing with crimes of 
sexual violence.142 It is noteworthy that no delegates are recorded as suggesting 
that the lack of a Rwandan or Serbian judge on the ICTR or ICTY, respectively, 
damaged the sociological legitimacy of those tribunals, such that the Rome Statute 
should guarantee that at least one national of an affected state should hear relevant 
cases.143  
The delegates’ lack of recognition of the importance of sociological and 
institutional legitimacy in this regard is perhaps understandable as they were 
working from a draft Statute that expressly precluded a national from an affected 
state to sit on the tribunal. Then-Article 42 provided that a Judge “shall be 
excluded from a case” if he or she “[is a national of a complainant State, [of the 
State on whose territory the offence is alleged to have been committee] or of a 
State of which the accused is a national].”144 This exclusionary requirement, drawn 
from the Zutphen Draft,145 had support from a number of delegates146 but was 
removed in the final version of the Rome Statute.147 
This deletion has proven significant as judges elected by the ICC’s Assembly 
of State Parties have, in fact, sat on cases involving their fellow citizens. For 
example, in 2009, Judge Nsereko, a Ugandan, heard an appeal involving Joseph 
Kony and other members of the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army.148 In 2012, 
two Sudanese defendants sought the disqualification of Judge Eboe-Osuji, a 
Nigerian, on the basis that the Judge “shares Nigerian nationality with sixteen of 
                                                 
141  See, for example, the Dutch delegate who suggested that the difficulties of the ad hoc Tribunals meant 
that in addition to professional qualifications, “actual trial experience was vital.” U.N. ICC 
Conference, supra note 131, 14th plen. mtg., at ¶ 40 (Mr. Verweij, Netherlands). 
142  U.N. ICC Conference, supra note 131, at ¶ 92 (Ms. Diop, Senegal).  
143  Cf. infra notes 143–46 and accompanying text. 
144  Rep. of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft 
Statute for the International Criminal Court, art. 42, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, (Apr. 14, 
1998). 
145  U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Rep. of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, June 15-July 17,1998, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13, at art. 35 (Feb. 4, 1998). 
146  See, for example, U.N. ICC Conference, supra note 131, 15th plen. mtg., at para. 74 (Japan), 91 (Israel), 
100 (Argentina), 110 (Venezuela), 113 (Islamic Republic of Iran), 122 (Mozambique), 125 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo), Cf. id. at ¶ 78 (Malawi).  
147  ICCSt, supra note 81, at art. 41.  
148  Prosecutor v. Kony et al., Case No. ICC-02/04 OA and ICC-02/04-01/05 OA2, Judgment on the 
appeals of the defence, (Int’l Crim. Ct. Appeals Chamber, Feb. 23, 2009). Judge Nsereko’s 
nationality appears not to have been raised during the proceedings. 
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the alleged victims in the case.”149 Sitting in plenary session, eleven judges denied 
the request, holding that “the mere co-incidence of shared nationality with some 
of the alleged victims did not provide a basis to reasonably doubt the impartiality 
of the respondent.”150 While a minority of two judges would have recused Judge 
Eboe-Osuji, his nationality was seen as an “aggravating factor,” relevant only in 
light of his election campaign and statements made in a blog post.151 Assumptions 
about how a judge will react to a case that involves his or her fellow nationals are 
just that—assumptions.152 
Article 41 of the Rome Statute provides that a Judge “shall not” participate 
in cases in which “his or her impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any 
ground” and includes a list of examples where disqualification must occur.153 
Unlike earlier drafts, Article 41 does not automatically disqualify judges who are 
nationals of an affected state. Instead, the question of recusal or disqualification 
turns on actual or apprehended bias.154 When assessing the appearance of bias in 
the eyes of a reasonable observer, there is a rebuttable presumption that judges 
are professional and will decide a case solely on the evidence before them.155 In 
the words of the ICTY Trial Chamber, “the nationalities and religions of Judges 
of this Tribunal are, and must be, irrelevant to their ability to hear the cases before 
them impartially.”156 
Although few studies have examined the sociological legitimacy of the ICC, 
there is some support for guaranteeing that ICC panels include judges from the 
affected state in question. Jenia Turner has argued for an “ICC-as-mixed-court” 
model essentially on fair reflection grounds, contending that local judges “are 
                                                 
149  Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Case No. ICC-
02/05-03/09-344-Anx, Decision of the Plenary of the Judges on the “Defence Request for the 
Disqualification of a Judge” of April 2, 2012, 2 (Int’l Crim. Ct., Plenary, June 5, 2012).  
150  Id. at 5, ¶ 15. 
151  Id. at 10, ¶ 29. 
152  James Cockayne, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Decisions on the Recusal of Judges Robertson and Winter, 2 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1154, 1162 (2004) (arguing that questions concerning judicial independence stem 
from the actions of judges themselves). See also Jones, supra note 137, at 256 (arguing that the 
“habitual intolerance or prejudice” of an individual judge is the most important consideration, 
rather than their nationality). Cf. Milan Markovic, International Criminal Trials and the Disqualification of 
Judges on the Basis of Nationality, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 24 (2014). 
153  ICCSt, supra note 81, at art. 41(2)(a). 
154  Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶¶. 683, 707 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber Feb. 20, 2001).  
155  Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, supra note 149, 
at 14. 
156  Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Motion for Disqualification, ¶ 3 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber June 10, 2003).  
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more likely to be attuned to the interests and preferences of local populations.”157 
This view accords with the most comprehensive survey of citizens of the DRC. A 
2007 survey of citizens from eastern DRC found that a majority of respondents 
preferred national justice institutions, including the national court system (51%) 
and military courts (20%) to justice delivered by the ICC (26%).158 Indeed, it is 
questionable whether Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto’s political attacks on the 
ICC as “the toy of declining imperial powers,”159 or the push to establish the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights as a regional criminal court,160 would 
reach as receptive an audience if a number of Kenyan or Sudanese judges sat on 
relevant ICC cases. 
C. The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia—Guaranteed 
Local Judges 
The ECCC and the SCSL are materially distinct from the courts examined 
thus far. Although judges at both tribunals are also to be persons of “high moral 
character, ([with] a spirit of) impartiality and integrity,”161 these courts are 
specifically intended to include local judges. The development of hybrid courts in 
general, and these two in particular, accords with the same theme underlying the 
principle of fair reflection: legitimacy. Hybrid courts are established with the 
support and agreement of the affected state rather than imposed by a Chapter VII 
Security Council Resolution, are situated in the affected state, include a 
combination of both local and international actors, and adjudicate substantive and 
procedural law drawn from both the affected state and international law. 
The Special Court is composed of eleven primary and two alternate judges. 
Three judges serve on the Trial Chamber, one of whom is appointed by the 
government of Sierra Leone and two by the Secretary-General of the U.N. In the 
Appeals Chamber, the Sierra Leonean government appoints two judges and the 
                                                 
157  Jenia Iontcheva, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 24, 36 (2005).  
158  Patrick Vinck et al., Living With Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and Social 
Reconstruction in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, 46 
(August 2008), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DRC-Attitudes-Justice-2008-
English.pdf.  
159  African Union Urges ICC to Defer Uhuru Kenyatta Case, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24506006. 
160  Assembly of the African Union, 12th Sess., Feb. 1–3, 2009, Decision on the Implementation of the 
Assembly Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Assembly/AU/Dec. 213(XII), at 
9; Assembly of the African Union, 13th Sess., July 1–3, 2009, Decision on the Meeting of African States 
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/13(XIII), at 5. 
161  SCSLSt, supra note 35; Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, supra note 74, at art. 10. 
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Secretary-General appoints three.162 At the Extraordinary Chambers, a majority of 
Cambodian judges sits on the Pre-Trial (3-2), Trial (4-3), and Supreme Court 
Chambers (3-2).163 Owing to concerns about potential political manipulation and 
judicial independence, however, decisions must be made by a super-majority of 
judges (in other words, one international judge must agree with her national 
counterparts).164 
The history of the establishment of both the ECCC and the Special Court 
illuminate the importance political actors placed on legitimacy. In a letter to the 
Security Council requesting the “setting up of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 
President Ahmad Kabbah sought a process rooted in Sierra Leone and “uniquely 
Sierra Leonean.”165 However, it is interesting to note that despite President 
Kabbah’s suggestion that the Special Court could give “preference” to sitting in 
country and that the co-prosecutor could be the Attorney-General of Sierra 
Leone, at this stage he does not suggest that any judges of the court should be 
Sierra Leonean.166 Nevertheless, President Kabbah understood the importance of 
contextual awareness and sociological legitimacy, suggesting that “[t]he judges 
could be drawn from West Africa and possibly other parts of the world.”167 
Unfortunately, the Secretary-General’s Report on the establishment of a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone is silent on the relevant negotiations that led to this 
shift.168 The Report simply notes that for perceptions of independence, 
objectivity, and impartiality, the Prosecutor should be an international, though a 
Sierra Leonean deputy should also be appointed.169 There is no discussion on the 
nationality of the judges, merely a draft Statute that provides for the appointment 
of judges by Sierra Leone and the Secretary-General upon nomination by the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Commonwealth 
states.170 Of course, in practice, this would likely result in a bench comprised in 
                                                 
162  SCSLSt, supra note 35, at art. 12.1. The additional judges come from a second Trial Chamber.  
163  Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, supra note 
74, at art. 9. 
164  Id. at art. 14. 
165  Permanent Rep. of Sierra Leone, Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative 
of Sierra Leone to the U.N. addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000) Annex Letter from Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the 
Republic of Sierra Leone on the proposed special court for Sierra Leone at 2, and Enclosure: 
Framework for the special court of Sierra Leone, at 4 (June 12, 2000). 
166  Id. at 5. 
167  Id. at 5.  
168  U.N. S.C., Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).  
169  Id. at 9, ¶ 47.  
170  Id. at art. 2.2–2.3.  
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line with President Kabbah’s suggestions. Thus, this Report and the establishment 
of the SCSL are significant, though underappreciated, developments for 
sociological legitimacy: Sierra Leonean judges reflect the local community, while 
the international judges are particularized in order to ensure greater contextual 
awareness of Sierra Leone and thus enhanced legitimacy.  
Negotiations over the establishment of the ECCC were more arduous but 
also centered on the issue of legitimacy. The Cambodian government preferred a 
wholly national court with international assistance, while the U.N. favored 
internationally-led proceedings. For Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the 
issue was clearly one of political and sociological legitimacy: “I do not wish a 
foreign woman to come to Cambodia and dress up in a Khmer dress. I want a 
Khmer woman to dress in a Khmer dress and for foreigners to come and help put 
on the make-up.”171 The U.N. also spoke in the language of legitimacy, but in 
emphasizing their concerns surrounding judicial independence, the U.N. stressed 
normative rather than sociological legitimacy. Indeed, the U.N. Group of Experts 
tasked with exploring the feasibility of apprehending and bringing to justice 
surviving Khmer Rouge leaders initially proposed a tribunal composed solely of 
international judges.172 
Despite some justifiable criticism relating to structure and operation, the 
ECCC and the Special Court appear to have secured popular support amongst 
their respective local communities. A 2010 survey by the Human Rights Center at 
Berkeley indicates that attitudes amongst Cambodians towards the ECCC are 
positive, with 83% believing that the ECCC “should be involved in responding to 
what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime.”173 Compared to the 2008 
survey, a higher proportion of Cambodians believed that the ECCC would “help 
rebuild trust” and “help promote national reconciliation.”174 Surveys in Sierra 
Leone suggest a similar pattern: that the Special Court’s overall legitimacy is not 
questioned to the same extent as the ICTY’s.175 While causality may be hard to 
                                                 
171  Youk Chhang, The Thief of History – Cambodia and the Special Court,1 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 
157, 167 (2007).  
172  Rep. of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 
52/135, 53rd Session, U.N. Doc. A/53/850, at 179 (Mar., 16 1999).  
173  Phuong Pham et al., After the First Trial: A Population-Based Survey on Knowledge and Perceptions of Justice 
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Human Rights Center, UC BERKELEY 
SCHOOL OF LAW (June 2011) at 26, available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC 
/Publications_After-the-First-Trial_06-2011.pdf. 
174  Id. at 29. An 11% and 14% increase, respectively. However, this optimistic account should be taken 
with some skepticism, as the survey found that only 54% of respondents “were able to identify 
Duch as the person who was on trial last year.” Id. at 27. On Duch: See: ECCC, Kaing Guek Eav, 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/kaing-guek-eav. 
175  Donna E. Arzt, Views on the Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal Tribunals in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 226, 233 (2006).  
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determine, it is likely that the presence of local judges on the ECCC and the Special 
Court has contributed to support, acceptance, and perceptions of legitimacy 
amongst each local community. 
However, it is important to note a few words of caution. For one, the 
underlying nature of the conflicts in Cambodia and Sierra Leone are considerably 
distinct from the conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.176 In Sierra 
Leone, “neither ethnic nor religious divisions played a central role” in the 
conflict.177 In Cambodia, despite the Khmer Rouge’s virulent nationalism and 
xenophobia, the majority of victims were ethnically Khmer.178 In Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia, on the other hand, ethnic and territorial motivations predominated, 
suggesting that the presence of local judges must be managed carefully. Moreover, 
even in situations more analogous to Cambodia and Sierra Leone, the presence of 
local judges and other actors may “bring the history and politics of local 
institutions”179 to the hybrid court. While sociological legitimacy demands a fair 
reflection of the local society on the bench, other notions of legitimacy would 
temper that demand if it would necessarily lead to accusations of partisanship or 
political interest. 
Additionally, in post-conflict settings where the judiciary has been decimated 
and/or very real questions revolve around the capacity and credibility of the legal 
sector, the independence and impartiality of local as well as international judges 
must be rigorously maintained. It is not clear that any hybrid tribunal has 
completely succeeded in this endeavor, and indeed, what success exactly entails is 
unclear. International lawyers might recognize with some modesty that 
international judges have their own “patrons”180 and that all constitutional courts, 
including their own, are often critiqued for adopting normative and ideological 
                                                 
176  Id. at 228. 
177  John Bellows & Edward Miguel, War and Institutions: New Evidence from Sierra Leone, 96 AM. ECON. 
REV. 394, 395 (2006). 
178  See U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Commission on Human rights, 52d Sess., Rep. on the situation of 
human rights in Myanmar prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1996/65 (Feb. 5, 1996); U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, 38th 
Sess., Revised and Updated Rep. on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
prepared by Mr. B. Whitaker, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, at 16, para. 31 (July 2, 1985); see also 
BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE 
KHMER ROUGE, 1976–79 (3d ed. 2008); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
118 (1st ed. 2000). Though for cases involving the destruction of Cham Muslims, ethnic 
Vietnamese, Buddhist monks and tribal peoples, etc., issues similar to those in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia will arise. 
179  James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 616, 649 (2005).  
180  Alvarez, supra note 128, at 422. 
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decisions.181 Whether or not this criticism is justified, it suggests that 
independence and impartiality are aspirational goals that can be placed on one end 
of a spectrum. Mechanisms designed to secure independence and impartiality, 
such as security of tenure and appropriate salary, can minimize the need for local 
judges to think beyond the life of the hybrid court and reduce their incentives to 
curry favor with the domestic government. They are not, however, foolproof. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the biggest concern with all hybrid 
courts is feasibility. Almost by definition, states where the establishment of hybrid 
courts is being considered are ones in which local expertise is unavailable. For 
example, in Cambodia, only six law school graduates survived the Khmer Rouge 
regime,182 and in Sierra Leone, the Secretary-General noted that local resources 
were either “non-existent or extremely scarce.”183 However, in that report, the 
Secretary-General also noted that, while “not experienced in the relevant fields of 
international criminal law” with training, local lawyers “could render an important 
contribution to the work and success of the Special Court.”184 This is a significant 
point: although local lawyers will rarely have experience in international criminal 
law, judicial training programs can enable them to make a valuable and valued 
contribution on the bench. The fact that the Special Criminal Court in the CAR 
is to be comprised of a majority of Central African judges suggests that it is a point 
that is increasingly well understood. However, where it is not possible (and it truly 
may not have been possible in East Timor),185 then the principle of fair reflection 
should cede to other considerations. Sociological legitimacy is not gained by the 
presence of corrupt or inadequate judges who happen to have a connection to the 
community. Merit remains the overriding concern. 
Nevertheless, these potential issues are problems of implementation rather 
than conception. If these issues can be resolved, the experience of international 
criminal tribunals suggests that including local judges can enhance sociological 
legitimacy and therefore should be a goal for all such tribunals—not just hybrid 
courts. The establishment of the Special Criminal Court in the CAR, with a 
majority of local judges, suggests that this lesson is being learned and applied.  
                                                 
181  In the U.S. context, see, for example, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987). 
182  Harry Hobbs, Foreign Correspondent, 37 ALT. L.J. 122, 122 (2012); Kevin Boreham & Harry Hobbs, 
Justice Denied for Cambodia, EAST ASIA FORUM (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.eastasiaforum.org 
/2011/12/22/justice-denied-for-cambodia/. 
183  U.N. S.C., Letter dated 6 March 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (Mar. 8, 2002) annex Rep. of the Planning Mission on the 
Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 3, ¶ 12. 
184  Id. at 4, ¶ 12. 
185  CAITLIN REIGER & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., THE SERIOUS CRIMES 
PROCESS IN TIMOR-LESTE: IN RETROSPECT, 11, 16 (2006), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/ 
files/ICTJ-TimorLeste-Criminal-Process-2006-English.pdf.  
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V. TOWARDS A GREATER PARTICULARIZATION OF  
THE INTERNATIONAL 
The disputed sociological legitimacy of the ICTY and ICTR, particularly 
when compared to the ECCC and the SCSL, affirms the significance of local 
judges adjudicating international crimes. But the simple division between “local” 
and “international” ignores important distinctions. As international lawyers are all 
too well aware, there is no homogeneous international community. Once this is 
understood, it becomes clear that the “international” judge can—and must—be 
particularized. In some respects, all supranational courts understand this. The 
requirement under Article 36(8) of the Rome Statute to consider geographic 
diversity and representation of the principal legal systems of the world in the 
selection of judges serves as an appropriate example. 
In reflecting the international community, it is important for international 
judges on international tribunals to be drawn from diverse backgrounds. 
However, the current approach to particularizing or “representing” the 
“international” in hybrid criminal tribunals is inadequate as it ignores the practical 
problems that arise when international judges are insufficiently aware or attuned 
to the contextual features of the local community. The failure of international 
judges and officials to educate themselves about the affected community they are 
supposed to assist has “been evident and deleterious” in many post-conflict 
situations.186 It is well accepted that “the fate of institutions is determined by the 
people that work in them;”187 if hybrid tribunals are to be perceived as legitimate 
by the local community, a key policy prescription in composing these courts must 
be to ensure that international judges are conscious and sensitive to local context. 
Particularizing international judges may enhance a court’s awareness and 
understanding of local cultural practices and thereby increase its acceptance 
among the affected community. There are three main elements ripe for 
particularizing: geography, legal tradition, and language.188 However, when 
appointing international judges, it is important to remember that a judge from the 
same geographic region and legal tradition of the affected state and who speaks a 
language of the affected state may be more likely to understand the local culture 
and history than a judge without this background, but this is not always true. 
Effective and reciprocal judicial training programs, as well as the particular 
characteristics of each judge as an individual, remain the most important elements 
in judicial appointment. 
                                                 
186  ORENTLICHER, supra note 125, at 22 (referring to the ICTY in relation to the Balkans). 
187  ROMANO, supra note 20, at 235, 269. 
188  This can be understood as creating the potential for great “cultural proximity” between the court 
and the community. See Jessica Almqvist, The Impact of Cultural Diversity on International Criminal 
Proceedings, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 745, 758 (2006).  
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A.  Geography and Legal Tradition 
International criminal tribunals generally include a requirement to consider 
geographic representation and representation of the world’s different legal 
traditions when appointing judges. Although this practice aims to ensure an 
equitable reflection of the international community, it too readily jettisons the 
importance of contextual knowledge and misconstrues the requirements of fair 
reflection. A fair reflection of the international community does not require the 
presence of a judge from each continent, nor a judge from each principal legal 
system. And, in fact, ignoring the importance of context risks destabilizing 
sociological legitimacy. 
Working in post-conflict or post-authoritarian states is often difficult for 
international judges and the tribunals’ staff. Aside from potential culture shock, 
homesickness, absence of creature comforts,189 and the intensity of the nature of 
the work, some staff may be concerned that they could be putting their domestic 
career on-hold.190 This has two consequences. First, it may reduce the quality of 
candidates available for appointment,191 and second, it may solidify divisions 
between the international and the local. Carla Del Ponte, then-Chief Prosecutor 
of the ICTY and ICTR summed up the difficulty: “it is not easy to stay and live 
here. I could not stay one year working in Arusha. . . . If it is like that for me, can 
you imagine what it is like for others?”192 Unfortunately this is a recurrent issue. 
For example, in the War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia-Herzegovina, international 
judges “resided elsewhere and flew into Bosnia once a month for a week-long 
session.”193 In Timor Leste, many international staff resided on a floating hotel 
moored off Dili; Hotel Olympia’s rates of $160 per night dwarfed the $3 a day 
salaries paid to the hotel’s Timorese workers.194 However much we may (or may 
                                                 
189  Chief Judge of the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor Phillip Rapoza noted that “the 
courthouse had electricity, at most, three days a week, owing to the unreliability of the public electric 
supply to which the building was connected.” See Phillip Rapoza, Hybrid Criminal Trials and the Concept 
of Ownership: Who Owns the Process, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 525, 531 (2006). The unreliability of 
electrical services was an issue at the ECCC as well. 
190  The growth of international criminal justice, however, is creating a new network of career 
opportunities. Elena Baylis, Function and Dysfunction in Post-Conflict Justice Networks and Communities, 47 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 625 (2014); Elena Baylis, Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies, 
10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 361 (2008).  
191  PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 54, at 15–16, noting that this has been the case in Kosovo 
192  Higonnet, supra note 18, at 362 n.33. 
193  Bruch, supra note 23, at 12. 
194  CAROLINE HUGHES, DEPENDENT COMMUNITIES: AID AND POLITICS IN CAMBODIA AND EAST 
TIMOR 98 (2009). For broader (and more strident) criticism concerning U.N. involvement in Timor-
Leste, see Tom Fawthrop, Dili Dallying, 29 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 15 (2000). In Kosovo, the 
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not) sympathize with the plight of international judges living a lifestyle below their 
normal standard, attitudes and actions like this further entrench physical and 
symbolic barriers between internationals and locals, “which in turn discourages 
that population from identifying with the tribunal.”195 
A potential solution to this problem involves prioritizing the selection of 
judges from regional states and from within the same legal tradition. If chosen 
carefully, a pronounced focus on regional neighbors and countries within the same 
legal tradition in the selection of international judges does not necessarily infringe 
the principle of fair reflection. This can also offer the potential for enhanced 
awareness of the local sui generis situation, bringing added legitimacy benefits to 
the institution.196 In addition to the problems canvassed already in this Article, 
some scholars have suggested that the absence of judges from nearby Arabic-
speaking countries on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has been a factor in its 
troubled quest for legitimacy.197 The same could be said with respect to the Iraqi 
High Tribunal.198 The SCSL suggests that this approach is neither radical nor 
infeasible. Nominations for appointment of international judges to the Court were 
made by ECOWAS and Commonwealth states.199 While there may be significant 
cultural differences between a judge from Bermuda and a judge from Sierra Leone, 
this is a worthy attempt at balancing contextual understanding and sociological 
legitimacy without sacrificing either. 
Further, despite the apparent commitment of international criminal courts 
to representing the principal legal traditions of the world, in practice the ICC, 
ICTY, and ICTR have tended to emphasize common law and civil law traditions 
to the exclusion of African customary law, Sharia law, and Hindu law.200 While 
potentially problematic, particularly in Rwanda where community–appropriate 
Gacaca courts were developed,201 this is likely merely a natural consequence of the 
                                                 
international and national staff were situated in different buildings. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra 
note 54, at 17. 
195  James Cockayne, Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes Trials as Unsuccessful Degradation 
Ceremonies, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 455, 458–59 (2005).  
196  The affected state (or states) may also be more willing to provide political and financial support to 
the court if it is staffed by judges from the region. Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened 
by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 125 (1998). 
197  Marieke Wierda, Habib Nassar & Lynn Maalouf, Early Reflections on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and 
Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1065, 1076–77 (2007). 
198  M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 327, 368 (2005). 
199  Agreement between the U.N. and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 2.2(a),(c), Jan. 16, 2002 (entered into force on Apr. 12, 2002). 
[hereinafter SCSL Agreement]. 
200  Jones, supra note 137, at 254–55. 
201  See generally William A. Schabas, Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 879 (2005).  
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development of international law, situated as it is within the civil and common law 
traditions;202 and the preponderance of civil and common law jurists on 
international tribunals. As such, hybrid courts have followed a similar pattern. 
That Commonwealth states may nominate a judge on the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone suggests that common legal tradition is an important characteristic for the 
success of hybrid tribunals. Both institutional legitimacy and pragmatism suggest 
that this is an appropriate step. 
This may be more difficult in practice than in theory. Every legal system in 
the world is, to some degree, mixed203 and each national legal system has its 
idiosyncrasies. Determining whether a particular country operates under a, for 
example, common or civil law system may strike many as simply more of the same 
top-down legal imperialism.204 Nevertheless, though the U.S. and Australian legal 
systems diverge in terms of institutions, processes, and rules, they can both be 
classed as common law systems. The same can be said, albeit more broadly, of 
Japan, the CAR, and France. Significantly, this general grouping should 
demonstrate that “any division of the legal world into families or groups is a rough 
and ready device.”205 The focus on legal tradition is meant to simply guide 
policymakers into selecting judges with knowledge of local context. The same is 
true of the regional component. Rather than arbitrarily restrict “the geographic 
region” in the abstract, policymakers should use their best judgment when 
determining the borders of the most appropriate region. In some cases it may 
make sense to include judges from neighboring states who were “involved” in the 
conflict in a passive sense, such as through accepting refugees.206 
Of course, the selection of judges from regional states and states of the same 
legal tradition is not an unqualified good. Even if a regional state was not involved 
in the particular conflict that culminated in a hybrid tribunal, “historical enmity 
and[/or] long-term competition over resources” may caution against appointment 
of a judge from a certain state.207 Conversely, the appointment of judges from 
regional states more interested in impunity than prosecution may weaken 
                                                 
202  Colin B. Picker, International Law's Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction, 41 VAND. J. 
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international criminal law as an institution.208 Relatedly, the legacy of colonialism 
has meant that many states’ legal systems were inherited from colonizing powers. 
Where violence and mass atrocity can be traced back to a colonizing power, either 
historically or contemporaneously, it may make practical sense to avoid, if 
possible, selecting judges from that country. Further, the presence of judges from 
varied legal traditions can spur constructive legal reasoning and enhance the 
developing jurisprudence of international criminal law. Thus, while there is both 
sociological legitimacy and efficiency value in appointing judges from the same 
legal tradition and geographic region as the affected state, this should not be 
considered an absolute rule; room for choice is always necessary.209 
B.  Common Language 
That judges on hybrid courts should speak a common language may be 
thought of as simply a pragmatic consideration. Language barriers on hybrid 
courts limit opportunities for mutual learning and the exchange of ideas,210 and 
the cost and delay associated with interpretation and translation places added 
strain on “shoestring” budgets.211 However, international law requires that an 
accused must be capable of understanding the charges against them,212 suggesting 
that interpretation and translation costs cannot be completely avoided. More 
broadly, it is important to remember that linguistic diversity can bring its own 
benefits in adjudication.213 
However, the principle of fair reflection may shed further light on the need 
for commonality of language. If the hybrid court is to adequately reflect the 
communities within its jurisdiction, it must be capable of being understood by 
those communities. Understood this way, the long running failure of the ICTY 
and ICTR to comprehend that their work should be translated into the local 
languages of the affected communities is particularly egregious.214 Although it is 
                                                 
208  For example, consider the African Union’s controversial decision to grant immunity from criminal 
prosecution for senior government officials before the proposed African Court of Justice and 
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likely that this situation will not occur again, it may be beneficial for international 
judges to speak a language of the affected community. 
Of course, international judges are “jurists, not linguists.”215 Their 
appointment on an international criminal tribunal should be dependent on their 
skill and expertise in the law, rather than their ability to speak a language of the 
affected community—particularly given that international crimes do not 
discriminate by geography or language. In this respect, ensuring adequate 
resourcing of professional interpreters and translators may be thought to be more 
important. Expert interpretation and translation is certainly critical to ensuring 
efficient administration of the court and effective communication with relevant 
communities. The systemic failure of the Special Panels of the Dili District Court, 
which took four years to hire its first professional translator,216 is a stark reminder 
of this fact. Nevertheless, where two candidates are equally qualified, preference 
should be given to the judge who can speak a language of the affected community. 
Such a policy would likely lead to better relationships within the hybrid court and 
between the hybrid court and the local community.217 
C. Judicial Training Programs  
The particularized factors that I have noted are only part of the story. As 
every court, domestic or supranational, criminal or civil, recognizes, the 
characteristics of the particular individual is the most important element in 
appointing a judge.218 However, beyond consideration of personal characteristics, 
there is room for specialized judicial training and continuing education programs 
for all judges on hybrid courts based on principles of respect and reciprocity. 
A lack of knowledge and awareness surrounding local customs and culture 
can manifest itself in condescending and dismissive attitudes. In Timor-Leste, 
                                                 
Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 55, 60–63 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 
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independent observers witnessed international judges demonstrating “patronizing 
attitudes to their national colleagues”219 and exhibiting a lack of cultural sensitivity 
when questioning witnesses.220 In Sierra Leone, researchers reported that at one 
point, a majority of the local judiciary refused to work with the Special Court 
because they “claim[ed] to have been patronized by the[ir] international 
counterparts.”221 A condescending mindset may arise in part from the dominant 
vision of international criminal justice, which relies on an “international as expert” 
model. Hybrid courts may unconsciously reinforce this model by tacitly 
supporting an unstated assumption that the role of the international judge is to 
impart her wisdom on lesser local counterparts.222 The bickering and infighting 
caused by the pretensions of the international judge directly results in lower public 
support for the hybrid tribunal as an institution.  
If the problem was simply a lack of knowledge, the solution would be easy: 
provide judicial training. However, often, judicial training programs are neither 
reciprocal nor effective. In Timor-Leste, for example, judicial training generally 
focused only on educating national judges on substantive and procedural aspects 
of international criminal law, rather than emphasizing important elements of 
domestic jurisprudence to internationals.223 This is often an issue of attitude or 
posture, rather than a problem of conception. In 2000, the ICTY held a training 
session for judges and prosecutors involved in the United Nation Mission in 
Kosovo on humanitarian law, but “[t]he majority of international judges and 
prosecutors did not attend.”224 The absence of international judges reinforced the 
problematic “international as expert” model. Further difficulties may arise at an 
implementation rather than conceptual level. The seemingly intractable ethnic 
conflicts that arise in many post-conflict situations may be too complex to come 
to terms with for internationals during the limited life of international courts. This 
seems to have been the case in the War Crimes Chamber for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In interviews, Bogdan Ivanišević noted that a national judge 
observed that “the most difficult part is to explain [to my foreign counterpart] the 
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mentalities, the way things are perceived here, the historical and religious context 
of this conglomerate called BiH.”225 
An effective judicial training program based on the principles of mutuality 
and respect will be structured to educate all judges, both local and international, 
in three areas: international criminal law and humanitarian law, the jurisprudence 
of the affected state, and the culture and history of the affected state. It is crucial 
for the legitimacy and success of these hybrid courts that in their operation, and 
despite their individual characteristics and background, the judges adopt a 
“common judicial outlook”226 and that they are perceived as a “united front” 
rather than a “jumbled-up professional group with too many mismatched 
nationalities and backgrounds.”227 One option for breaking down symbolic 
barriers may be to have national judges hold training programs on domestic 
jurisprudence to their international counterparts. Eric Witte has noted that beyond 
the substantive merit in familiarizing internationals with the system in which they 
will be working, “it would establish at the outset that learning is expected to be 
mutual.”228 This option is certainly worthy of further consideration. 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The operation of international criminal tribunals “often entails serious 
legitimacy challenges.”229 An incompletely theorized conception of hybrid tribunal 
composition has contributed to these challenges. Scholars recognize that these 
courts offer “a promising framework,”230 but that the “transfer of knowledge and 
the strengthening of local capacities rarely happen automatically.”231 While each 
court is a sui generis institution, global lessons can be learned. One of these is that 
it is important to ensure that international judges are not “over-valoriz[ed]” and 
unconsciously “neutralized as expert.”232  
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This Article has argued that the principle of fair reflection can offer a firmer 
normative basis for the composition of hybrid courts, potentially enhancing 
legitimacy. This is not a radical proposal. In 1474, Sir Peter von Hagenbach was 
accused of “trampl[ing] under foot the laws of God and man” for atrocities 
committed during the occupation of Breisach. In what is widely accepted as the 
starting point of international criminal justice,233 von Hagenbach was brought 
before an ad hoc tribunal composed of twenty-eight judges: 
Eight of [the judges] were nominated by Breisach, and two by each of the 
other allied Alsatian and Upper Rhenanian towns [Strasbourg, Selestat, 
Colmar, Basel, Thann, Kenzingen, Neuburg am Rhein, and Freiburg im 
Breisgau], Berne, a member of the Swiss Confederation, and Solothurn, allied 
with Berne.234 
As the affected state, Breisach nominated a plurality of “local” judges. The 
remaining “international” judges were particularized—nominated by regional 
states and states with a legal system common to Breisach.  
In international criminal law’s quest for legitimacy, it may seem odd to return 
to a time before the birth of international law. However, much of the concern 
surrounding international criminal justice is its distance—both physical and 
theoretical—from primary victims. For too long international justice has been 
“justice divorced from local realities.”235 International criminal law’s challenge is 
to make justice available on a personal level.236  
The establishment of the Special Criminal Court in the CAR is promising. It 
is hoped that it will go some way to remedying the “serious and unabated 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law” which have been 
“committed in a climate of total impunity.”237 This possibility is strengthened by 
the court’s structure. As this Article has argued, a majority of local judges offers a 
firmer normative basis for enhancing the legitimacy of the court among the 
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affected community. If the international judges eventually appointed to the court 
have sufficient connection to the CAR; if they hail from central African and civil 
law states and/or speak Sangho or French, the court’s sociological legitimacy will 
be further grounded. In turn, a sociologically legitimate court offers the best 
prospect of resolving the crises crippling the CAR. Kosovo, South Sudan, the 
DRC, and Sri Lanka will be watching with interest. 
